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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of the support for the European Central Bank (ECB) in 
the member-countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and their evolution from 1999 
to 2015. Our contribution is to examine micro-level socio-demographic characteristics from 
the Eurobarometer surveys jointly with macroeconomic indicators of trust in a central bank in 
order to evaluate econometrically their relative importance over time. Pseudo-panel logit 
estimates reveal that the former have a dynamically stable, and generally stronger influence 
taken altogether, when compared with the latter. Interestingly, we find that while expected 
inflation becomes a positive determinant of trust in the ECB after the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), actual inflation gets no statistical significance. Having taken centre stage in the 
monetary policy debate in the Euro area post-GFC and especially since 2013, excessive 
disinflation and risk of deflation attracted strong attention by the public, and have 
consequently affected its perceptions about the ECB. Accordingly, our results emphasize 
forward-lookingness of the EMU population with regard to ‘deflation scares’ in determining 
trust in the ECB, in addition to disentangling the contributions of the key individual-level 
socio-demographic factors, and can duly inform ECB’s communication strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009 and the subsequent Euro-area debt 
problems, especially in the so-termed ‘peripheral’ or PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain), have led to doubts and disapproval from politicians and the public with 
regard to the models, forecasts, policies and communication strategies employed by monetary 
authorities. This lower credibility of monetary policy increases the incentives of politicians to 
criticise central banks and to exert pressures on their institutional independence (Waller, 
1991). Moreover, since early 2013 excessive disinflation and risk of deflation have taken 
centre stage in the monetary policy debate in the Euro area, attracting condensed attention by 
the public. Such turbulent and unusual developments at the background of the Great 
Moderation (from around 1993 through 2007) have undoubtedly affected the perceptions of 
the population in the member-states of the European Monetary Union (EMU) about their 
supranational and highly independent central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB). During 
such precarious episodes, central banks need the strongest support from the population they 
can mobilise. Public support is particularly relevant and pressing for a relatively young 
institution such as the ECB, the more so in the wake of the deepest global recession for nearly 
a century. Since its creation, the ECB has suffered from accusations of a lack of 
accountability1 and, consequently, of misaligned interests and policies with respect to national 
governments and electorates. The GFC and the Euro-area debt crisis have made the concern 
even more acute. 
 
In a nutshell, if people trust the ECB, then its legitimacy as a supranational institution and the 
credibility of its monetary policy will be higher.2 It can furthermore be argued that trust in the 
ECB and support for its policy could be enhanced by active communication (explaining its 
objectives, constraints, instruments and effects) with the European polities. A clear and 
transparent communication strategy is even more needed if the population’s support for a 
central bank’s policy declines, as it seems to be the case post-GFC, and not just in the Euro 
area. But, as Blinder et al. (2008) show, no consensus has shaped out on an optimal 
communication strategy of a central bank. 
                                                 
1 See, among others, Berman and McNamara (1999), the debate between Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999), and 
Kaltenthaller et al. (2010). 
2 One can expect central bank support to be also sensitive to the business cycle (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011). 
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Although some papers have attempted to check how ECB’s communication is received by the 
markets, very few have been able to ascertain the width of the support for the ECB in the 
European population at large. It can certainly be affirmed that monetary policy impacts 
everyone’s everyday life. Starting from such a premise, the study of attitudes and values is 
now recognised as an important source of information for economists, and the availability of 
the Eurobarometer survey data has put the European integration process under the 
magnifying glass (see, e.g., Gabel, 1998, or Nelsen and Guth, 2000). Concerning monetary 
issues in particular, Gärtner (1997), Hayo (1999) and Jonung (2004) examine the emergence 
of the Euro as a currency and its popular support. 
 
But the trust of the Europeans in the ECB and its evolution over time has not yet been 
exhaustively explored. In fact, such a literature is only emerging. Moreover, research has 
mostly looked one-sidedly either at the typical macroeconomic (country-level) indicators 
determining trust in a central bank, such as inflation, unemployment, real GDP growth and 
fiscal measures, or at the standard socio-demographic (individual-level) determinants of 
central bank trust. By contrast, the present paper is among the first to examine micro-level 
socio-demographic factors from the Eurobarometer surveys jointly with alternative 
macroeconomic indicators of trust in the ECB over the whole span of the EMU across time 
(survey waves) and space (member-countries). Our purpose with such an approach is to 
evaluate and compare the relative importance of these two major types of determinants of 
trust in the ECB, as well as to study their evolution as the EMU membership has been 
expanding. 
 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) analyse the support for a European monetary policy, but in 
a very early and short sample, 1994-1997, i.e., when the single currency was not yet born. 
Hudson (2006) provides some evidence on trust in the ECB, showing that the usual socio-
demographic variables are significant. However, the data used is for the year 2001 only. 
Banducci et al. (2009) examine the evolution of trust in the Euro, analysing how Europeans 
have perceived the inflationary effects of the transition to the new currency. Kaltenthaler et al. 
(2010) have evaluated the distrust of the public opinion in the ECB. They find that the distrust 
towards the ECB is stronger when people consider that the bank is too autonomous to reflect 
their own preferences. However, differently from our work here, they rely on a single survey 
wave (Eurobarometer 65.2 of 2006) and do not include any macroeconomic indicators as an 
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explanatory variable. Moreover, distrust is considered with regard to the degree of 
independence the ECB enjoys, and not with regard to the policy it implements. 
 
Studies of the macro-determinants of the trust in the ECB at a country level have also 
emerged. Fischer and Hahn (2008) show that higher inflation reduces the trust in the ECB. 
Roth (2009), Wälti (2012) and Gros and Roth (2014) have revisited such findings, in 
particular focusing on the impact of the GFC on the support for the ECB, and argue that the 
banking distress and the fiscal turmoil have affected negatively the degree of trust in the ECB. 
All these studies, however, completely ignore any socio-demographic determinants of support 
for the ECB, limiting attention to alternative macro-determinants, such as unemployment, 
inflation or GDP per capita. Only recently Ehrmann et al. (2013) have merged micro-data 
with macro-indicator dimensions in such an analysis, like we do, but their focus is on the fall 
in the trust in the ECB caused by the GFC in an immediate aftermath until the spring of 2010. 
They show empirically that it reflected (i) the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, (ii) 
a general fall in the trust in all European institutions following the crisis and (iii) the severity 
of banking sector problems, as the ECB may be perceived to have been responsible for it. 
 
The present paper, therefore, sets out to exploit the richness of the individual-based responses 
and characteristics in the Eurobarometer survey waves over the whole history of the ECB to 
date, notably highlighting trends over the post-GFC subperiod (2009-2015), which none of 
the cited studies do. A benefit of using survey data is that they provide an independent source 
of information about agents’ perceptions. Consequently, one need not impose modelling 
assumptions to back out those perceptions. Also, as Ehrmann et al. (2013) state, using 
individual-level data allows controlling for the effect of different variables that influence trust 
in the ECB and identify the marginal effect at the individual level. In other words, one can 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and thus provide more reliable estimates. Our results 
confirm some of the findings in Ehrmann et al. (2013), e.g., about the statistical importance of 
age, gender, political orientation and educational attainment. Yet we expand this set to include 
also occupation status, income (where data allow it), and expectations about the economy, as 
well as a number of country-level institutional and historical features such as fiscal prudence 
and the experience of past hyperinflations. Since none of the studies we quoted, apart from 
Ehrmann et al. (2013), deals with blending micro-data with macro-data, our main contribution 
is to do so and compare their relative influence on trust in the ECB, as it evolves over time 
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and with expanding EMU membership. In such a sense, our approach is more general and 
encompassing. 
 
Methodologically too, there are many differences with respect to the closest literature. Fischer 
and Hahn (2008) express the country level of trust in the ECB as the share of “yes” responses 
in the national samples of the Eurobarometer survey, focusing on alternative annual proxies 
for the state of the macroeconomy lagged by a year. They apply a fixed-effects generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimator motivated by the nature of the dependent variable, measured in 
continuous percentage points. Wälti (2012) studies empirically, via panel data regressions 
using monthly data, country-level net trust in the ECB (“yes” responses minus “no” responses 
in the same survey) as a function of macroeconomic developments. He claims two 
innovations relative to the literature: (i) the linkage of the fall in net trust during the GFC to 
the large divergence of sovereign bond yields across the Euro area countries; (ii) since crises 
exhibit high-frequency dynamics, the use of monthly data as explanatory variables. Roth 
(2009) and Gros and Roth (2014) both also focus on the impact of the GFC on trust in the 
ECB, working with country-level net trust too. Gros and Roth (2014) estimate net trust in an 
unbalanced panel with country fixed effects as a function of quarterly adjusted inflation, or 
growth of GDP per capita, or unemployment, and control variables. 
 
Differently, our aim is to compare econometrically the relative influence of individual socio-
demographic characteristics as determinants of trust in the ECB over the whole period of its 
functioning with that of the usual country-level macro-determinants of trust in a central bank. 
We perform pseudo-panel logit estimation revealing that the former have a dynamically 
stable, and hence predictable, and if taken altogether stronger, influence than the latter in 
relative terms, as measured by the magnitudes of the respective statistically significant 
average marginal effect coefficients. Interestingly, we find that expected inflation becomes a 
positive determinant of trust in the ECB in the subperiod following the GFC, while actual 
inflation gets no statistical significance – neither in the pre-GFC, nor in the post-GFC 
subperiods. The interpretation we suggest is related to the excessive disinflation and risk of 
deflation which have taken centre stage in the monetary policy debate in the Euro area since 
early 2013. This debate has attracted condensed attention by the public and has without doubt 
affected its perceptions about the ECB. Our results seem to emphasise forward-looking 
behaviour of the EMU population with regard to potential ‘deflation scares’ in determining 
trust in the ECB as well as fiscal prudence among the macro-indicators that matter, in addition 
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to disentangling and comparing the contributions of the key socio-demographic factors. These 
points are important because of their policy implications, in particular the need to target the 
ECB’s communication strategy towards specific social groups. 
 
The paper is further organised as follows. Section 2 describes the measurement and 
determinants of public trust in the ECB as well as our econometric approach. Section 3 then 
presents our baseline empirical results, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Data, Measures and Trends 
 
Our data comes from the Eurobarometer survey. This survey, dealing with issues of general 
interest, is conducted on behalf of the European Commission since 1973. The results are 
published in Eurobarometer and are available on the Gesis website.3 
 
2.1 Measuring Trust in the ECB from the Eurobarometer Survey 
 
We have used Eurobarometer surveys 52.0 (November 1999) through 83.3 (May 2015), 
selecting those waves of the survey that include the question on trust in the ECB we are 
interested in. The waves of the survey we employ (see Table 1) cover all 19 current EMU 
member-countries (in Euro-area changing composition). 
 
Among other questions, the respondents are asked about the importance of the major 
European institutions, including the ECB, and their trust in them, in particular in the ECB 
(e.g., Question 28_6 in Eurobarometer 52.0), which is of our direct interest here, as follows: 
 
“Q.28 And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? 
Q.28_6 The European Central Bank” 
 
The responses are recorded in the following way: 1 for ‘Tend to trust’, 2 for ‘Tend not to 
trust’, and 3 for ‘Don’t know’. We measure the trust in the European Central Bank by 
transforming this categorical variable into a binary one, excluding the responses coded 3 that 
                                                 
3 http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp. For replication purposes, an additional *.zip file archive is available; 
it contains our STATA data set, codes and the respective input and output files. 
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do not express an opinion. The binary discrete choice variable thus obtained becomes our 
dependent variable. However, just excluding the ‘Don’t know’ category raises a problem, as 
people could be more interested in economic matters when things turn bad. In fact, we are 
able to confirm this countercyclical nature of the trust in the ECB: fewer people declare 
themselves in this third category near the end of our sample period. Moreover, it may also be 
that people decide first to express an opinion or not, and only then on what their opinion 
would be, creating a potential sample selection bias. For these reasons, two alternative 
estimations complemented our main one: (i) imputation to handle missing data in a way 
resulting in valid statistical inference (Rubin, 1987); (ii) two-step correction for sample 
selection bias (Heckman, 1976, 1979). The essence of the baseline results highlighted further 
below was preserved. 
 
Our country sample contains all the current 19 EMU members (see figures 1 and 2). In order 
to look at the potential interesting dynamics in the support for the ECB that may be present 
across the length of our sample period, we report results on several time subsamples. Hence, 
we split the whole sample period in the following subperiods: before the last main EU 
enlargement (1999-2004), before the GFC (1999-2008), after the GFC (2009-2015), and the 
full period (1999-2015). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the average (across all included survey waves) national (within a 
given EMU member-country) level of trust in the ECB is higher in the Netherlands (75.2%), 
Malta (74.8%), Luxembourg (73.5%) and Finland (70.1%), where above 70% of the 
respondents tend to trust the ECB. By contrast, the weakest average support, below or just 
about 50%, characterizes some of the countries with the deepest sovereign debt problems in 
the EMU such as Greece (45.2%), Cyprus (46.5%) and Spain (50.2%) – but also France 
(49.8%). Figure 1 also indicates the minimum and maximum (across all included survey 
waves) national (within a given EMU member-country) levels of trust in the ECB. 
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Table 1. Included Eurobarometer Survey Waves 
No. in Our 
Sample 
Original No. 
Original 4-
Digit Code 
Period Year Year Wave 
1 52.0  3204 Oct-Nov  1999 2nd  
2 53.0  3296 Apr-May  2000 1st  
3 54.1  3387 Nov-Dec  2000 2nd  
4 55.2  3507 Apr-May  2001 1st  
5 56.2  3627 Oct-Nov  2001 2nd  
6 57.1  3639 Mar-Apr  2002 1st  
7 58.1  3693 Oct-Nov  2002 2nd  
8 59.1  3904 Mar-Apr  2003 1st  
9 60.1  3938 Oct-Nov  2003 2nd  
10 61.0  4056 Feb-Mar  2004 1st  
11 62.0  4229 Oct-Nov  2004 2nd  
12 63.4  4411 May-Jun  2005 1st  
13 64.2  4414 Oct-Nov  2005 2nd  
14 65.2  4506 Mar-Apr  2006 1st  
15 66.1  4526 Sep-Oct  2006 2nd  
16 67.2  4530 Apr-May  2007 1st  
17 68.1  4565 Sep-Nov  2007 2nd  
18 69.2  4744 Mar-May  2008 1st  
19 70.1  4819 Oct-Nov  2008 2nd  
20 71.3  4973 Jun-Jul  2009 1st  
21 72.4  4994 Oct-Nov  2009 2nd  
22 73.4  5234 May  2010 1st  
23 74.2  5449 Nov-Dec  2010 2nd  
24 75.3  5481 May  2011 1st  
25 76.3  5567 Nov  2011 2nd  
26 77.3  5612 May  2012 1st  
27 78.1  5685 Nov  2012 2nd  
28 79.3  5689 May  2013 1st  
29 80.1  5876 Nov  2013 2nd  
30 81.2  5913 Mar  2014 1st  
31 81.4  5928 May-Jun  2014 2nd  
32 82.3  5932 Nov  2014 3rd  
33 83.3  5998 May  2015 1st  
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Figure 1. Average National Support for the ECB by Current EMU Member-Country, % 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, from Eurobarometer survey data. 
Note: As Lithuania joined the EMU in 2015, we have only one survey for it in our sample. That is why only one 
value for Lithuania (minimum = maximum = average) is displayed in the LTU bar of the figure. 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the dynamics of trust in the ECB by Eurobarometer survey waves in each of 
the 19 current EMU member-countries. A general trend is that trust in the ECB has declined 
in all EMU member-states post-GFC relative to pre-GFC. While in about one third of the 
countries in our sample this decline has been relatively smooth and shallow (alphabetically, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia) in, roughly, another third, 
essentially those most heavily affected by the Euro-area debt crisis, it has been sharp and deep 
(Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal), with the remaining last third of the 
EMU member-states displaying a trust evolution profile that falls somewhere in-between. 
 
The summary statistics on the trust in the ECB by socio-demographic category in our EMU 
sample are displayed in Table 2 and give a preview of some of the tendencies and results we 
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shall be discussing when analysing the estimated regressions later on. In particular, trust in the 
ECB tends to increase its mean (in percentage terms) with higher education, income, and 
optimism of economic expectations; also, the unemployed trust the ECB the least (in relative 
percentage terms), and female EMU citizens trust the ECB less than male EMU citizens. We 
next propose justification for considering these determinants of public trust in the ECB, 
whereas interpretation of the noted tendencies follows in the later sections. 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of Trust in the ECB by Current EMU Member-Country, % 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data. 
Note: Again, as Lithuania joined the EMU in 2015, we have only one survey for it in our sample. That is why 
dynamics is not displayed in the LTU panel of the figure. 
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Table 2. Trust in the ECB by Socio-Demographic Category – Summary Statistics 
 
            Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data. 
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2.2 Determinants of Trust 
 
In accordance with the literature, we include in our estimates the major macroeconomic 
determinants of trust in the ECB, such as inflation (actual or expected) or, alternatively, 
unemployment or real GDP growth, as well as national economic or institutional dummies to 
capture the effects of past hyperinflation episodes and fiscal prudence (or lack of it) as per the 
criteria in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). To these macro-determinants, we add and 
jointly estimate key micro-determinants, namely, socio-demographic characteristics measured 
through categorical variables covering the following dimensions: education, income, 
employment status, economic expectations, political placement, gender, and age of the 
respondents. 
 
Macroeconomic variables – such as inflation, real GDP growth, the unemployment rate and 
some transformations of these variables (lags or other) – have been shown to matter in the 
related studies cited above, but mostly when considered in isolation from socio-demographic 
determinants of central bank trust. Given that the ECB has price stability as its primary goal, 
and communicates it clearly to the public, actual inflation is the most natural macroeconomic 
determinant of trust in the ECB to be considered in our estimation.4 Data on inflation comes 
from the Eurostat, measured as the annual percentage change in the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). Focusing attention on actual inflation as the key business cycle 
control variable is even more important with regard to the question at hand, because inflation 
experience can strongly shape people’s preferences and, thus, their attitudes to the central 
bank, as Erhmann and Tzamourani (2012) show. 
 
With respect to the key socio-demographic determinants of trust, Walstad and Rebeck (2002) 
observe that education is an important determinant of an individual’s preference concerning 
an economic issue, as well as measuring labour market skills and cognitive abilities (Scheve, 
2004). However, there is no consensus about the effect of education on an economic issue: for 
instance, Hainmüller and Hiscox (2006) find that people with college education are more pro-
trade while other forms of education are not significant in evaluating trade policy. In our case, 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, preliminary estimates with lags of the inflation rate, with inflation and inflation squared, or re- 
placing inflation by GDP growth (lagged or not) or by unemployment (lagged or not) delivered similar 
qualitative results. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we only report here estimates with inflation, initially, but 
complement these, subsequently, with estimates when actual inflation is replaced by inflation expectations. 
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we assume education to be linked to an understanding of the costs of inflation and of the 
macroeconomic role and institutional mandate of the central bank. Education would thus be 
one main determinant of support for the ECB.5 
 
Then, individual income proved influential in Jayadev (2006) for people’s attitude towards 
inflation. In our case, income is hypothesised to pertain to an individual’s self-interest: for 
example, if they own nominal assets and aim to preserve their purchasing power. Such a 
motivation suggests that individual income should be among the main socio-demographic 
determinants of support for the ECB.6 Although income and education would generally be 
correlated, disaggregating the data within each of these two explanatory variables, as we do 
and discuss further down, possibly reduces the effects of such a correlation, allowing us to 
separate out the respective influences of the underlying components. 
 
The literature has also suggested that employment status could be important, with the 
unemployed people less supportive of a central bank focusing too much on inflation, as low 
inflation levels could lead to a distortion of the Phillips curve trade-off (see Akerlof et al., 
1996). Such a distortion may push up the sacrifice ratio, and be perceived as costly, in 
particular by the unemployed and retired people. We therefore include occupation dummies 
for the unemployed and the retired. Moreover, as the probability of being unemployed, or to 
have one’s income reduced, is linked to business cycles fluctuations, we also take into 
account the economic expectations the surveyed declare. 
 
Previous studies (Nelsen and Guth, 2000; Scheve, 2004) have revealed that women are less 
concerned about economic issues, so we add gender in our regressions. Age can also be 
important with respect to inflation aversion and, hence, central bank independence issues 
related to the role of the ECB. Farvaque and Mihailov (2009) and Farvaque et al. (2010) show 
that an older population acts as a strong weight against inflation, while Malmendier and Nagel 
(2015) present evidence that individuals of different ages react differently to past inflation 
experiences. The latter study points to the need to also consider the experience of 
hyperinflation some people might have lived through. We therefore include in our estimates a 
                                                 
5 Yet, we acknowledge the potentially ambiguous interpretation regarding the effect of education in our context 
too. More educated people may be observing more critically how the ECB is performing. If they think that the 
ECB is not doing a good job, trust may weaken. 
6 Ideally, data on wealth and on asset detention would be preferable, but are not available. 
 15 
dummy variable with value 1 if the country has known a hyperinflation episode in the 20th 
century.7 As monetary policy outcomes (in the extreme, hyperinflation episodes) are related to 
fiscal policy outcomes (Fischer et al., 2002) and, more importantly, to account for the 
fulfilment of the SGP fiscal criteria, we include two other country-level dummies: SGPDEBT 
has a value equal to 1 if the country shows a public debt to GDP ratio superior to the 60% 
limit, while SGPDEF is equal to 1 if the country shows a public deficit to GDP ratio superior 
to the 3% threshold. To explore potential differences in the opinion of the main subgroups of 
current EMU member-countries, we also add dummies for the original 6 members of the EU, 
denoted EU6,8 the subsequent 12 members of the EU, EU12,9 and for the ‘newcomers’ with 
the big EU enlargement in 2004, EU2004.10 
 
We further include political characteristics of the respondents. In the surveys we use, a 
political placement indicator approximates political ideology. Political orientation can 
obviously change individual attitudes towards important economic issues and institutions, 
including inflation and the central bank. Finally, as trust in the ECB could be related to an 
overall pro-EU attitude, we also add a dummy variable to capture trust in the European 
Commission, constructed out from the Eurobarometer survey.11 
 
2.3 Econometric Issues and Methodology 
 
Since our dependent variable is a binary categorical variable – taking the values of 1 and 0 
according to whether a particular respondent tends to trust or not, respectively, the European 
Central Bank – a survey-based quasi-panel logistic regression model is well suited for our 
purpose.12 In our baseline, we include time fixed effects but exclude country fixed effects, in 
order to obtain meaningful estimates of the hypothesised country-level macro-determinants 
alongside with the micro-determinants of trust in the ECB. In the Eurobarometer survey data 
                                                 
7 In our sample, this is the case for Germany and Greece in the immediate aftermath of World War I and/or II 
and for Slovenia during its transition from a centrally-planned to market economy in the early 1990s. 
8 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
9 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. 
10 The Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
11 This aspect is also addressed in Ehrmann et al. (2013). Further analysis comparing trust in the ECB with trust 
in the European Commission and the European Parliament as dependent variable in support of the robustness of 
the results we report later on regarding trust in the ECB can be found in the working paper version of the present 
article, Farvaque et al. (2011). 
12 Note that the Eurobarometer survey is not a true panel, as respondents change in each wave. 
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we employ, any time-invariant framing effects will also be country-specific.13 As is standard 
in panel-data analysis, time fixed effects are meant to control for unobserved aggregate 
shocks that would otherwise introduce omitted variable bias and impair statistical inference.14 
 
Our baseline empirical model therefore takes the following form:15 
 
Trusti(t)j = f ( Infjt ; Dem’i(t)j ; Pol’i(t)j ; EcoExp3i(t)j ; D’jt ; Tt ; c ) + i(t)j  (1) 
 
where 
Dem’i(t)j = ( GDi(t)j ; Age4i(t)j ; Edu4(t)j ; UDi(t)j ; RDi(t)j ; [Inc4i(t)j] )’ 
Pol’i(t)j = ( Pol3i(t)j ; ECDi(t)j )’ 
D’jt = ( Hyperinflationjt ; SGPDEBTjt ; SGPDEFjt ; EU6jt ; EU12jt ; EU2004jt )’, 
 
and Trusti(t)j is the opinion of a respondent i at time/wave t of the Eurobarometer survey in 
country j. Infjt is the measure of actual or expected inflation at t in country j.
16 
 
The ‘demographic’ vector Dem’i(t)j contains the gender of the i-th respondent to the t-th 
survey wave in the j-th country, the dummy GDi(t)j, and other categorical variables: Age4i(t)j is 
the age group of the respondent in 4 ordered categories: 15-24 years, 25-44 years, 45-64 
years, 65+ years; Edu4(t)j is the education level of the respondent in 4 ordered categories: up to 
15 years of age at the time of obtaining the highest degree, 16-19 years, 20+ years, still 
studying; UDi(t)j is the dummy for the unemployed and RDi(t)j for the retired; Inc4i(t)j is the 
income quartile of the respondent (hence, in 4 ordered categories). 
                                                 
13 For an alternative estimation with both time and country fixed effects that is meant to isolate away all 
aggregate variation in the data and, thus, check robustness with regard to distinguishing which micro-factors are 
most important, the interested reader is referred to the working paper version, Farvaque et al. (2011). The results 
we report further below regarding the relative influence of the socio-demographic determinants of trust in the 
ECB are not affected significantly in qualitative and quantitative terms if country fixed effects are added. 
14 Wälti (2012) argues in favour of an estimation strategy with both country and time fixed effects, but his 
regressions do not include socio-demographic explanatory variables. He focuses only on macro-determinants of 
trust in the ECB in an earlier sample of 12 EMU economies, while we look at both macro- and micro-factors for 
all current 19 EMU member-countries. 
15 The data by income quartiles is not available for the whole sample period, but only up through 2004. We 
denote this in the equations below by the use of square brackets. The statistical significance and economic 
importance of this key explanatory variable in our context have been checked by excluding/including it in 
alternative specifications. 
16 In our empirical implementation, actual inflation is approximated by the average HICP annual inflation rate in 
the respective year of the Eurobaromater survey, and expected inflation is one year ahead. The definition and 
source of inflation expectations in the Euro area are taken from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(SPF), with the data available online at http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/index.en.html. 
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The ‘political’ vector Pol’i(t)j contains the trust in the EU Commission dummy, ECD i(t)j, and 
an ordered categorical variable, Pol3i(t)j, accounting for the political placement of the 
respondent in 3 categories: left, centre and right. 
 
EcoExp3i(t)j indicates the expectation of the respondents about the economic situation in the 
next twelve months, with response options given by ‘better’, ‘worse’ or ‘same’. 
 
Time (year) fixed effects, Tt, capture trends common to all countries, such as the GFC. i(t)j is 
the individual disturbance in the regression, c the constant term. We also add other dummies 
(already defined), D’jt, in the versions of (1) we estimated, as explained above. 
 
In line with most of the micro-econometric literature involving binary-choice dependent 
variables, we estimate the parameters of our general empirical model in (1) using dynamic 
logit regressions. We, in effect, assume that our measure of trust in the ECB, Trusti(t)j  Yi(t)j – 
which could be thought of as the conditional probability of a ‘yes’ response P(Yi(t)j =1  xi(t)j) 
to the relevant survey question given the covariates, or ‘predictors’, collected in the vector of 
explanatory variables, xi(t)j – more specifically follows a logistic distribution, so that:  
 
   𝑃(𝑌𝑖(𝑡)𝑗  = 1 |𝑥𝑖(𝑡)𝑗  ) =
1
1+𝑒
−(𝑐+𝑇𝑡+𝛽
′𝑥𝑖(𝑡)𝑗)
   (2) 
 
Then, a higher level of c + Tt  + ’xi(t)j would imply a higher level of trust for the particular 
definition of the employed (sub)sample, with  denoting the vector of estimated coefficients. 
Since we are merging country-level inflation and dummies with micro-data, it is important to 
consider the possibility that disturbances will be correlated across countries. Hence, standard 
errors are clustered by country and require the much weaker assumption that errors are 
independent across countries but not necessarily across survey respondent within a country 
(Moulton, 1990). 
 
Another issue in the analysis is the weighting of the survey data. We followed the proposal of 
DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) to include sampling weights and interaction terms between 
the weights and the independent variables in the regressions to detect possible 
misspecifications. In almost all cases, we could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
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of the sampling weights and the interaction terms were equal to zero. This indicated that our 
results are not sensitive to the weighting, and thus we base their reporting on unweighted data. 
 
To observe whether variations in the support for the ECB occur over time, we split our full 
sample period (1999-2015) across several subperiods: 1999-2004 (pre-EU enlargement), 
1999-2008 (pre-GFC), 2009-2015 (post-GFC). 
 
 
3. Results on the Determinants of Trust in the ECB and Their Evolution 
 
3.1 Baseline Regressions 
 
Assuming the logistic distribution in (2), we estimate our baseline nonlinear regression (1) by 
maximum likelihood. Table 3 presents the results from an initial specification where we use 
actual inflation as the key macro-determinant of trust in the ECB. Apart from average 
marginal effects by covariate, with their respective standard errors and significance levels, we 
report as a goodness-of-fit measure for each of our alternative specifications the McFadden’s 
(1974) Pseudo-R2, computed in the usual way, 
 
0 < 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2 ≡ 1 −
ℒ1
ℒ0
< 1 
 
where ℒ1 is the log-likelihood of the estimated specification while ℒ0 is the log-likelihood of 
a ‘null’ model including only a constant term. 
 
As was noted, the Eurobarometer surveys discontinue publishing the income quartile 
characteristics of the respondents after 2004. For this reason, income quartiles appear only in 
specification/column (1) in Table 3 and the following tables, and not when estimates are 
reported up through 2008 or 2015. Such a discontinuity causes concern, though, as our results 
confirm that income is a significant and positive determinant of trust in the ECB. More 
precisely, trust in the ECB is an increasing function of income (quartile), implying that ECB’s 
communication needs to be tailored to different income categories. 
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Nevertheless, comparing specifications (0) and (1) in Table 3, we can say that although 
accounting for income quartiles is clearly justified, it does not modify substantively the other 
results. That is, specifications (0) and (1) contain exactly the same statistically significant 
variables in terms of sign, while magnitudes may minimally change. Each of these 
specifications explains about one-third of the variation in the dependent variable, a relatively 
large proportion for similar micro-econometric studies.17 
 
Table 3. Baseline Regression Results Using Actual Inflation 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1999-2004 1999-2004 1999-2008 2009-2015 1999-2015 
 
Actual Inflation 0.010 0.014 -0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Gender Dummy (BL: Male) -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age (BL: 15-24) 
25-44 0.007 0.000 0.010 0.010** 0.008* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
45-64 0.020 0.010 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
65+ 0.017 0.012 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Education (BL: Up to 15) 
16-19 0.016* 0.006 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
20+ 0.044*** 0.023** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Still studying 0.017 -0.000 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Political Placement (BL: Left) 
Centre 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Right 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Occupation Dummies 
Unemployed -0.037*** -0.027** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Retired 0.000 0.008 -0.004 -0.012** -0.007* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Economic Expectations (BL: Same) 
Better 0.014** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Worse -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Income (BL: Q1) 
                                                 
17 Note that we cannot compare such goodness of fit in a directly relevant way to similar studies, e.g., with 
regard to Ehrmann et al. (2013), since they do not report pseudo R-square for their probit regressions. 
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Q2  0.029***    
  (0.007)    
Q3  0.037***    
  (0.007)    
Q4  0.062***    
  (0.006)    
Other Dummies 
Trust in EU Commission 0.381*** 0.383*** 0.386*** 0.404*** 0.397*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
SGPDEF -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.066** -0.052** -0.061*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) 
SGPDEBT -0.014 -0.021 -0.039** -0.048* -0.041** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) 
Hyperinflation 0.032 0.034 -0.011 0.011 0.015 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
EU6 0.005 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.010 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) 
EU12   0.014 -0.047 -0.028 
   (0.038) (0.031) (0.032) 
EU2004   0.064** -0.001 0.010 
   (0.030) (0.023) (0.021) 
 
Observations 48,129 29,297 112,930 110,504 205,575 
Pseudo R-Square 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.38 
 
Notes: The table provides logit regression results on the determinants of trust in the ECB in the EMU member-
countries (changing composition), estimated using equation (1). Coefficients report the average marginal effects, 
with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. BL: Base levels for the categorical variables. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
Our results further indicate that women trust less the ECB than men, and that older people 
accord stronger support to the ECB than younger ones. Also, trust in the ECB tends to 
increase with education levels and as one goes from ‘left’ through ‘centre’ and to ‘right’ in the 
political spectrum. The latter finding might have been expected given that the European 
Central Bank is generally considered as a rather conservative institution. Unemployed people 
trust the ECB less than employed people; the retired dummy becomes significant only when 
longer samples are considered, showing that retired people also tend to trust the ECB less than 
people at work (although the estimated average marginal effect is smaller than for 
unemployed). Those individuals who maintain pro-European views, in the sense of having 
higher trust in EU institutions such as the European Commission, display higher trust in the 
ECB as well. Among the socio-demographic variables with the strongest estimated average 
marginal effects on the support for the ECB by the European population at large are, notably, 
the higher-level education, the unemployment status, the two top income quartiles, and the 
centre- to-right political orientation. 
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Economic expectations are strongly significant too, with the expected sign: the better the 
expected future, the higher the degree of trust in the ECB, as its monetary policy is generally 
perceived to influence the EMU macroeconomy. Citizens from countries with high fiscal 
deficits and debts tend to trust the ECB less than citizens from the remaining EMU member-
states, with the estimated average marginal effect of public debt being inferior to that of the 
public budget deficit (which may be a more ‘visible’ or discussed variable than debt). 
 
Although it has already been documented that the global financial crisis has decreased trust in 
the ECB (Ehrmann et al., 2013; Gros and Roth, 2014), our results shed new light on this 
evolution, by going deeper and revealing the categories among which trust has decreased 
more. Comparing the results displayed in columns (2) through (4) in Table 3 allows looking at 
the evolution of support over time and categories. It appears that the support from the 
working-age population with more experience (age 45-64) and from the ‘still studying’ part of 
the population has eroded significantly post-GFC. An interesting observation is also that the 
respondents who are confident in the European Commission increased their trust in the ECB 
during this period. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, actual inflation is not statistically significant, even at the 10% level, 
in all our estimated specifications in Table 3. This result differs from the findings in Wälti 
(2012), but he considers only macro-determinants and not socio-demographic factors. Our 
result also differs from the findings in some – but not all – of the specifications in Ehrmann et 
al. (2013), where inflation and unemployment are both included in the estimated probit 
regressions in addition to socio-demographic determinants in their Eurobarometer survey 
sample much shorter (1999-2010) and narrower (12 EMU member-countries only versus the 
remaining non-EMU EU member countries) from the ones we report here. In our case, the 
addition of socio-demographic variables seems not just to complement but rather to 
‘overshadow’ the influence of a key macroeconomic variable such as inflation as potential 
determinants of trust in the ECB. However, as can also be verified in the results of Ehrmann 
et al. (2013) for various subsample specifications and various sets of explanatory variables 
included, the statistical insignificance of observed inflation is not robust, hence not that much 
surprising.18 Nevertheless, to address a potential sensitivity of such findings to the relevant 
                                                 
18 It could be argued that inflation does not appear significant because of the relatively low level of inflation in 
the Euro area, its low variance during our sample period, and the fact that the Euro area is also characterized by 
 
 22 
proxy for perceived inflation, we proceeded by replacing actual inflation with inflation 
expectations. The resulting estimates are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Regression Results Using Expected Inflation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1999-2004 1999-2008 2009-2015 1999-2015 
 
Expected Inflation 0.015 0.007 0.125*** 0.115*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
Gender Dummy (BL: Male) -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age (BL: 15-24) 
25-44 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
45-64 0.011 0.032*** 0.021** 0.016** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
65+ 0.014 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.024** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Education (BL: Up to 15) 
16-19 0.006 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
20+ 0.023** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Still studying -0.002 0.038*** 0.016 0.017** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Political Placement (BL: Left) 
Centre 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.009** 0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Right 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Occupation Dummies 
Unemployed -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Retired 0.004 -0.004 -0.015*** -0.011*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Economic Expectations (BL: Same) 
Better 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Worse -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.027*** -0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Income (BL: Q1)     
Q2 0.029***    
 (0.007)    
Q3 0.036***    
 (0.006)    
Q4 0.061***    
 (0.006)    
Other Dummies 
Trust in EU Commission 0.385*** 0.386*** 0.418*** 0.411*** 
                                                                                                                                                        
persistent intra-zone dispersion in inflation rates (see, e.g., Altissimo et al., 2011; Gregoriou et al., 2011). Yet, 
removing the statistically insignificant inflation terms does not change the essence of the reported results. 
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 (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
SGPDEF -0.059** -0.064** -0.022 -0.046* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) 
SGPDEBT -0.015 -0.040** -0.064** -0.052** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.023) 
Hyperinflation 0.028 -0.020 0.021 0.035 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.027) (0.024) 
EU6 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.018 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
EU12  0.023 -0.052 -0.046 
  (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) 
EU2004  0.069*** -0.015 -0.039* 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.022) 
     
Observations 29,297 112,930 110,504 205,575 
Pseudo R-Square 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.37 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Comparing tables 3 and 4, it appears that our initial findings and interpretations have to be 
nuanced, as follows. Expected inflation (one year ahead from the year of the respective survey 
wave) now emerges as a key macroeconomic (country-level) determinant of trust in the ECB 
for the full sample period, 1999-2015. However, it only becomes significant in the later sub-
period, with a relative importance that has increased over time: measured in terms of the 
estimated average marginal effect, it has risen from statistical insignificance in the pre-GFC 
(1999-2008) subsample to positive significance of a magnitude of 0.125 in the post-GFC 
(2008-2015) subsample and, hence, to 0.115 for the entire (1999-2015) sample. This 
magnitude nevertheless ranks the relative influence of expected inflation on the estimated 
trust in the ECB as the second largest among the included explanatory variables. It is roughly 
four times weaker than a positive general pro-EU attitude, as proxied by trust in the European 
Commission, and about twice stronger than the negative influence of macro-variables such as 
measures of fiscal problems, whose magnitude is also comparable to that of the strongest 
positively-influencing socio-demographic variable, namely, the highest range of acquired 
education (20+). 
 
Thus, the strongest determinant of trust in the ECB as captured by the average marginal effect 
in our estimated logit regressions in both tables 3 and 4 is a pro-EU attitude. Its contribution is 
significantly positive and of a magnitude of 0.397 (Table 3) to 0.411 (Table 4) for the whole 
sample (1999-2015). Interestingly, this factor has been dynamically stable, rising slightly 
from 0.386 for the pre-GFC subsample to 0.418 for the post-GFC subsample (estimates as in 
Table 4). With the second largest influence accounted by expected inflation, two other 
macroeconomic dummies come in third position in terms of their estimated (although 
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negative) relative influence on trust in the ECB: the two measures of fiscal difficulties: the 
deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios with regard to the SGP ceilings (Table 4). Then, as 
reflected in Table 4, the unemployed micro-level dummy has evolved from a significant 
negative average marginal contribution of -0.032 in the pre-GFC subsample to -0.046 in the 
post-GFC subsample, resulting in a whole sample magnitude of -0.047. Similarly, the debt-to-
GDP macro-level dummy has increased its relative contribution from significant negative -
0.040 in the pre-GFC subsample to -0.064 in the post-GFC subsample, with an overall 
magnitude of -0.052 in the whole sample. By contrast, the deficit-to-GDP macro-level 
dummy has lost some of its relative importance as trust determinant of the ECB, from 
significant -0.064 pre-GFC to insignificant post-GFC and finally significant -0.046 in the 
whole sample. 
 
The relative importance among the socio-demographic determinants of trust in the ECB in 
Table 4 when compared with Table 3 is generally preserved, in statistical significance as well 
as in sign and magnitude of the estimated average marginal effects. High education continues 
to account for the strongest, and positive, influence: in absolute value of magnitude, the most 
educated fraction of the EMU population matters roughly as much as the negative influence 
of both the unemployed micro-level dummy and the fiscal macro-level determinants, but 
twice less than the positive influence of expected inflation. The marginal effect of high 
education (20+) has been slightly declining, though, in a dynamic perspective: from 0.067 
pre-GFC to 0.056 post-GFC and ultimately 0.052 for the whole sample (Table 4). The relative 
influence of the many other statistically significant socio-demographic determinants of trust 
in the ECB is roughly at least twice weaker than that of high education. 
 
Table 4 thus confirms what Table 3 already uncovered: ECB is trusted more by the older 
people, but their post-GFC support has declined from the corresponding pre-GFC support, 
more so for the working population of 45-64 years of age (in Table 4, from 0.032 in the pre-
GFC subsample to 0.021 in the post-GFC subsample and 0.016 for the whole sample). The 
same holds true for the political orientation, where the trust of the centre-oriented population 
layers has declined much more pre- (0.023) versus post- (0.009) GFC to account for 0.015 
over the whole sample, relative to the right-oriented ones (displaying approximate dynamic 
stability of the estimated coefficients: 0.030 against 0.027, by GFC sub-period, and 0.027 for 
the whole sample). Favourable expectations regarding the economic situation have also 
increased their positive relative influence on trust in the ECB from pre- (0.017) to post- 
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(0.030) GFC, to arrive at 0.025 for the whole sample. At the same time, unfavourable 
expectations with respect to the economic situation have decreased their negative relative 
influence from pre- (-0.041) to post- (-0.027) GFC, to arrive at -0.032 for the whole sample. 
The retired people dummy has increased its relative influence as determinant of trust in the 
ECB from statistical insignificance pre-GFC to significant -0.015 post-GFC, to account in the 
whole sample for a significant -0.011. 
 
Another result worth noting is that the neither the founding EU6 nor the subsequent EMU12 
subgroup dummies are ever significant, whereas the EU2004 newcomer subgroup dummy has 
first (in the sub-period 1999-2008) accorded higher trust to the ECB, before becoming more 
sceptical, as the coefficient is significant and equal to -0.039 for the whole sample (Table 4). 
 
3.2 Robustness Checks: Adding Interaction Terms 
 
As a key robustness check, we report next results with the introduction of interactions 
between the socio-demographic characteristics and expected or observed inflation.19 Table 5 
adds interactions with expected inflation, and reveals a further refinement in the interpretation 
of our results reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 5. Regression Results Using Interactions with Expected Inflation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1999-2004 1999-2008 2009-2015 1999-2015 
 
Expected Inflation -0.043 -0.308** -0.047 -0.063 
 (0.048) (0.129) (0.043) (0.041) 
 
Gender Dummy (BL: Male) -0.066*** -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Gender x Exp. Infl. 0.030** -0.009 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Age (BL: 15-24) 
25-44 -0.026 -0.022 -0.063** -0.032 
 (0.065) (0.042) (0.025) (0.023) 
45-64 -0.077 -0.046 -0.081*** -0.056** 
 (0.072) (0.046) (0.028) (0.026) 
65+ -0.055 -0.075 -0.054** -0.035 
 (0.066) (0.051) (0.026) (0.027) 
(25-44) x Exp. Infl. 0.017 0.019 0.045*** 0.024* 
 (0.040) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) 
                                                 
19 Of course, we conducted a much more exhaustive sensitivity analysis, including in EU – not just EMU – 
subsamples; see the working paper, Farvaque et al. (2011). 
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(45-64) x Exp. Infl. 0.056 0.044* 0.067*** 0.049*** 
 (0.041) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) 
(65+) x Exp. Infl. 0.043 0.063** 0.064*** 0.045*** 
 (0.039) (0.029) (0.016) (0.016) 
Education (BL: Up to 15) 
16-19 0.020 -0.043 -0.020 -0.030 
 (0.053) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020) 
20+ 0.113* -0.071* -0.032 -0.024 
 (0.062) (0.040) (0.021) (0.021) 
Still studying -0.067 -0.134* -0.062 -0.073* 
 (0.086) (0.074) (0.038) (0.039) 
(16-19) x Exp. Infl. -0.009 0.039** 0.028*** 0.033*** 
 (0.033) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) 
(20+) x Exp. Infl. -0.057 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.053*** 
 (0.036) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010) 
(Still Studying) x Exp. Infl. 0.041 0.097** 0.056** 0.062*** 
 (0.052) (0.041) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political Placement (BL: Left) 
Centre -0.034 0.026 0.001 0.002 
 (0.047) (0.025) (0.013) (0.010) 
Right 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.017 
 (0.061) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) 
Centre x Exp. Infl. 0.038 -0.002 0.006 0.009 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) 
Right x Exp. Infl. 0.016 0.005 0.018 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) 
Occupation Dummies 
Unemployed -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
Retired 0.005 -0.004 -0.012** -0.007* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Economic Expectations (BL: Same) 
Better 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Worse -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Income (BL: Q1) 
Q2 0.028***    
 (0.007)    
Q3 0.035***    
 (0.006)    
Q4 0.060***    
 (0.006)    
Other dummies 
Trust in EU Commission 0.385*** 0.386*** 0.404*** 0.397*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
SGPDEF -0.064** -0.067** -0.053** -0.061*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.021) 
SGPDEBT -0.013 -0.040** -0.049* -0.041** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.020) 
Hyperinflation 0.026 -0.016 0.012 0.015 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) 
EU6 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.010 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) 
EU12  0.019 -0.048 -0.028 
  (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) 
EU2004  0.065** -0.001 0.011 
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  (0.029) (0.023) (0.021) 
     
Observations 29,297 112,930 110,504 205,575 
Pseudo R-Square 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.38 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Now the interaction terms with expected inflation have picked up all or most of the statistical 
significance of the corresponding socio-demographic variables kept as non-interacted 
regressors. Moreover, inflation expectations remain significant but now negative, with a 
relatively strong average marginal effect of -0.308, although only pre-GFC. This indicates 
that before deflationary trends and fears emerged in the zero lower bound (ZLB) environment 
following the GFC what mattered to build up trust in the ECB were expectations of lower 
inflation, as it should naturally be more intuitive. With regard to the socio-demographic 
factors, political colour and also gender (except before the EU enlargement in 2004) lose 
statistical significance. The rest of the results are essentially unchanged, with the nuance that 
the interaction terms with inflation expectations display stronger marginal effects relative to 
the corresponding factors that are in the regression but not interacted. Otherwise, education, 
age, and income when interacted with inflation expectations remain of the same significance 
and sign and of a close magnitude to their estimated effects without these interactions 
reported in Table 4. The statistical significance and relative influence of optimistic 
expectations regarding the future of the economy and the dummies such as unemployed, 
retired, pro-EU attitude and fiscal prudence are also kept with the same significance levels 
and sign and no much quantitative change. 
 
Finally, Table 6 adds interactions with actual inflation (in place of the interactions with 
expected inflation in Table 5), and can therefore be compared to Table 3. 
 
Now, most importantly, actual inflation remains insignificant throughout, as was in Table 3. 
The nuance, however, analogous to what we stressed about Table 5, is that the interacted term 
of actual inflation with gender shows that men tended to accord more trust to the ECB than 
women before the EU enlargement in 2004 and, less so, before the GFC. Differently from 
Table 5, the interacted terms with actual inflation do not pick up the statistical significance of 
most of the influential socio-demographic characteristics as reported in tables 3 and 4, and the 
signs are generally unchanged and with mostly similar magnitudes. 
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Table 6. Regression Results Using Interactions with Actual Inflation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1999-2004 1999-2008 2009-2015 1999-2015 
 
Inflation -0.006 -0.013 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Gender Dummy (BL: Male) -0.034*** -0.048*** -0.034*** -0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
Gender x Inflation 0.008** 0.007* 0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age (BL: 15-24) 
25-44 -0.023 0.001 0.005 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) 
45-64 -0.027* 0.025 0.019*** 0.020** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.006) (0.008) 
65+ -0.005 0.034 0.042*** 0.037*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) 
(25-44) x Inflation 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
(45-64) x Inflation 0.017** 0.003 0.005* 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) 
(65+) x Inflation 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
Education (BL: Up to 15) 
16-19 -0.005 0.018 0.024*** 0.022*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
20+ 0.023* 0.062*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) 
Still studying -0.002 0.032* 0.021* 0.026** 
 (0.025) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) 
(16-19) x Inflation 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
(20+) x Inflation -0.000 0.001 0.006** 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
(Still Studying) x Inflation 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Political Placement (BL: Left) 
Centre 0.020* 0.013 0.010** 0.010* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Right 0.012 0.016 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Centre x Inflation 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
Right x Inflation 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Occupation Dummies 
Unemployed -0.026** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Retired 0.009 -0.004 -0.012** -0.007* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Economic Expectations (BL: Same) 
Better 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Worse -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
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Income (BL: Q1)     
Q2 0.028***    
 (0.007)    
Q3 0.036***    
 (0.007)    
Q4 0.062***    
 (0.006)    
Other Dummies 
Trust in EU Commission 0.383*** 0.386*** 0.404*** 0.397*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
SGPDEF -0.068*** -0.066** -0.053** -0.061*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) 
SGPDEBT -0.021 -0.039** -0.048* -0.041** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) 
Hyperinflation 0.034 -0.011 0.010 0.015 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
EU6 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
EU12  0.014 -0.046 -0.027 
  (0.038) (0.031) (0.032) 
EU2004  0.064** -0.001 0.011 
  (0.029) (0.023) (0.021) 
     
Observations 29,297 112,930 110,504 205,575 
Pseudo R-Square 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.38 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
 
A natural interpretation of these results is that, in ‘normal times’ (i.e., when macroeconomic 
prospects induce a positive inflation rate – potentially higher than the targeted one), as was 
the case for the EMU before the GFC, expected inflation has a strong negative influence 
(significant average marginal effect of -0.308 over 1999-2008 in Table 5) on trust in the ECB. 
By contrast, in the exceptional situation of ‘deflation scares’ (when fighting deflation is of 
prime concern), as was the ECB case operating at the ZLB after the GFC, expected inflation 
has an apparently counterintuitive – but, as we argue here, still logical – weaker positive 
influence (significant average marginal effect of 0.125 over 2009-2015 in Table 4) on trust in 
the ECB. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
All in all, then, our results confirm the importance and stability of socio-demographic 
determinants of trust in the ECB. Concerning the macro-level determinants, our findings 
reveal that expected rather than actual inflation matters, and with a relative influence that 
depends upon the macroeconomic environment (pre- versus post-GFC, in particular). 
Moreover, another novel result is that the sign (not just the magnitude) of the estimated 
average marginal effect of expected inflation changes across time and country composition of 
the EMU sample, uncovering an insightful dynamic relationship. 
 
Beyond, and in addition to, country-level inflation perceptions in a given macroeconomic 
context, we looked into many micro-factors and asked: “Who supports the ECB?” Our 
empirical findings provide these answers: people with higher – rather than lower – level of 
education; people with higher – rather than lower – level of income; people with centre to 
right-wing – rather than left-wing – political orientation; people with optimistic expectations 
on the economic situation; men – rather than women. Not surprisingly, the unemployed are 
among the socio-demographic groups that trust the ECB less, as they would care primarily to 
find a job, and so a source of income. 
 
Hence, our results suggest that the level of support for the ECB is quite predictably 
determined by a number of time-invariant individual characteristics, or at least by ones that 
are only likely to move very slowly. Trust in the ECB is also determined by expected (and not 
actual) inflation. The key macro-policy implication, then, is that the ECB should be able to 
deliver inflation close to its target (around 2% per year, on average) to anchor inflation 
expectations as a key macro-determinant of trust in the ECB. In turn, the key communication-
strategy implication appears to be that, being unable to modify the micro-determinants, the 
ECB should at least adapt its communication with due respect to their nuances we revealed. It 
has to channel its central bank ‘speak’ to the various different categories of citizens, 
depending upon their estimated degree of support. It is nowadays widely recognized that if a 
central bank is to exert some influence on the economy, such an influence depends critically 
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on its ability to manage market, and thus agents’, expectations.20 Communication being a 
fundamental aspect of this ability, knowing with whom to communicate is of key importance, 
especially for a supranational institution such as the ECB, as the distance to the citizens is 
larger than for national central banks. 
 
  
                                                 
20 This issue is of course related to the degree of (economic and financial) literacy of the audience, and goes 
beyond the European case (see Carvalho and Nechio, 2014, for a related analysis for the US). 
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